Posts tonen met het label Treasury. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label Treasury. Alle posts tonen

donderdag 9 februari 2012

What is wrong with housing anyway? (Warning: wonkish)

This is a post I have been meaning to write for some time, but the current spur is the Treasury briefing for the incoming minister. It is mostly very good, but included in it is the canard about over-investment in housing. This is a refrain we hear repeatedly, usually in phrases like “New Zealanders love affair with housing”, but I think the theoretical and empirical basis for the assertion of overinvestment is weak at best.

The main issue is one of tax-induced distortions. With owner-occupied housing, the purchase of a house is an investment, which generates an inputed rent that the owner pays to himself. The payment of this imputed rent is not subject to GST, nor is the rental income subject to income tax. There is also the issue of whether the absence of a capital gains tax is a further distortion, but I have discussed that issue here, here, here, and here. In this post, I want to explain why I don’t find it obvious that there is a distortion due to the lack of tax on inputed payments of a homeowner to himself. In part, this is a response to comments by Phil Meguire in the first of the capital gains posts.

To start with, let’s get an obvious point out of the way. Housing is a good thing, and nicer housing is better than worse housing, holding all else the same: If non-neutral taxes induce more investment in housing and less in other forms of investment than a neutral system, there is a cost, but it is the difference between the value of the flow of goods that would have been produced and the value of the flow of services produced by the housing, a difference which is not necessarily significant. I suspect that some of those decrying our love affair with housing are making the mistake of thinking that just because the purchase of housing services is a non-market transaction it doesn’t contribute to economic well-being. Similarly, it is irrelevant if the alternative investment would increase labour productivity, increase exports, etc. productivity and exports are just means to increasing the value of the goods the economy can consume; so is building houses. (Surprisingly, Greg Mankiw appears to make this mistake here, but to be fair we can attribute this to the need for simplification in an op-ed article, and his basic point—that the U.S. should get rid of the crazy mortgage-interest deduction—is sound.)

The next point to note is that the optimal tax rate on owner-occupied housing has to be considered in the context of an existing distortion: With an income tax, saving is subject to double taxation. If I choose to work today in order to buy consumption goods today, there is a difference between the value of what I produce and the value of what I consume, because of an income tax. But if I choose to work today in order to buy consumption goods in the future, there is an even bigger distortion between the value of what I produce and the value of what I consume, because the value of my work is taxed twice, once on my labour income and again when the interest income is taxed. We then have a classic second-best Ramsey taxation problem. The theoretical optimal tax on the return from investing in owner occupied saving will be somewhere between having no taxation on the saving (so as not to distort the decision between consumption today and investment in housing), and the full double-taxation rate applying to other forms of saving (so as not to distort the decision between investment in housing and other investment). So if normal investment returns are taxed at, say, 33%, the optimal housing tax will be positive but less than 33%.

And finally, here is the point that is overlooked in all the commentary on housing investment that I have seen. The flow of services from owner-occupied housing is currently subject to a tax. In other words, this graph, taken from the Treasury’s briefing to the incoming-minister, is wrong.


To see why, consider how a value-added tax like the GST works. Businesses charge GST on their sales, but deduct from their net tax liability the GST they have paid on purchases of goods and services. Expenditure on investment therefore reduces their tax liability, which is what makes the GST ultimately a tax on consumption and not investment income. When consumers buys a new house, they are making an investment, the return for which is the flow of housing services they will receive over time. The inputed payments they make to themselves are not subject to the GST, but unlike other business investment, the initial house purchase is, which has the same effect. (And, as I noted in an earlier post, the existence of a GST pushes up the prices of second-hand goods by the rate of the tax, so the argument is no different for owners who purchase an existing rather than newly built house.)

This is another example of the beauty of pure value-added taxes. By shifting in part from an income tax to a value-added tax, the rate of double taxation on delayed consumption is reduced. At the same time, the effective rate of taxation on the consumption of owner-occupied housing is increased from zero. We end up with a system where the tax rate on owner occupied housing is somewhere between 0 and the rate applying to other investment, just as Ramsey tax theory would stipulate. Whether it is higher or lower than the optimal rate is a difficult empirical question to which I don’t know the answer. But I have not seen any of “New Zealander’s love-affair with housing” commentators seek to address it. Furthermore, given that there are no simple methods of increasing the tax rate on owner-occupied housing that don’t bring their own problems (we have no mortgage-interest deduction to get rid of, for instance), I find it hard to believe that we have an over-investment problem that is worth solving.

woensdag 1 februari 2012

Treasury!

Treasury's advice to incoming Ministers, now released, looks rather good. I'll really look forward to whether any of these translate into policy proposals.

In their advice to the incoming Minister for Regulatory Reform they suggest priority be placed on fixing the RMA; labour markets (in particular ACC, minimum wages, and occupational regulation); housing supply; innovation IP and standards; and the Overseas Investment Act. They also want to tighten up requirements on Regulatory Impact Statements (which haven't seemed particularly binding).

The Briefing to the Minister of Finance recommends ... well, this is more easily done as bullets.
  • A faster return to budget surplus and debt reduction; 

  • Strengthening of the Public Finance Act to "reduce the risks of procyclical fiscal policy during future periods of strong economic growth";
    • Hopefully, this could bind a future version of 2005's Michael Cullen from ruining an otherwise decent run. 

  • Targeting early childhood education subsidies to lower income households; 
    • Makes perfect sense, especially in combination with increased work requirements in welfare reform.

  • Have fewer but better teachers teaching larger classes. 
    • This is entirely consistent with what I've seen of the educational literature: small class sizes don't do much to help, but good teachers do a lot. 

  • Welfare reform: in particular, reduce the age at which work testing applies for sole parents on benefit.
    • I like this. Before you note the unfairness of making sole parents work, do consider that we've had both our kids in daycare from the time they were three months old. Suggesting that I pay more in taxes so others can spend more time with their kids makes me angry. But I worry that it might induce some on benefit to have more children so as to remain eligible. Is it impossible to make the sole parent benefit conditional on use of reliable long-term birth control? 

  • Reduce taxes by broadening bases. 
    • I'd really need to see specifics here as there aren't obvious candidates for base-broadening that would be likely to result in aggregate deadweight loss reductions. They seem to hint differences in effective capital taxation on owner-occupied housing as compared to other investments might be basis for policy changes; they'd then have the somewhat tricky problem of either forcing low income folks out of their homes for inability to pay capital gains on accrual, or forcing kids to sell the family home to pay capital gains on realization, or inducing distortions in duration of home-ownership if you can avoid paying taxes on unrealized capital gains.

  • Fix regulatory regimes around RMA, local government, housing supply and the minimum wage.

  • Shift science and innovation funding to focus on commercialisation
    • This isn't crazy; there's a big world on whose contributions to basic science we can free-ride. But it's also debatable whether commercialization and applied work can be done by folks who aren't conversant in the basic science.

  • Encouraging use of prices as demand management for Auckland transport; use market structures for encouraging more efficient water use.

  • "Ensure that the longer-term recovery strategy is realistic, maintains confidence in the future of the city, and contributes to the return of normal operation in the insurance, financial, property and labour markets". 
    • I'm not sure that $1billion + light rail systems are realistic. Neither am I sure that initial Council plans did much to encourage confidence. 

  • Phased increases in the age of eligibility for government superannuation
    • Raucous applause.

  • Reintroduce interest on student loans
    • Raucous applause again
Throughout the document, Treasury's lobbing bricks at the outcomes of Director's Law: that democratic governments wind up using welfare to benefit the middle class rather than the poor. 
For example, government spending on social services (ie, health, education and income support) increased by almost 20 per cent more for households in the top half of the income distribution than for households in the bottom half of the income distribution between 1997/98 and 2009/10 (figure 18). The spending increases for higher-income households have been primarily driven by higher education, health and NZS expenditure. Better targeting of these social service expenditures could both improve overall social outcomes and reduce fiscal costs.
I hope they're able to get half of what they're aiming for.

dinsdag 4 oktober 2011

Blaming Treasury

Let's recall our potted history of the finance company bailouts. In short, in the midst of the 2008 election campaign, then Labour Finance Minister Michael Cullen wanted a deposit guarantee scheme to match the Australians. Our banks are Australian owned, so worries about differences in treatment across the ditch weren't crazy.

What was crazy was extending that protection to dodgy finance companies at no risk premium. Treasury worried that giving banks cover but not finance companies would have finance company depositors pull their funds and deposit them instead into banks (about which I'd have said "meh"), but Treasury also specifically warned* that they had to be charged a premium that reflected their higher risk. Instead, actuarially fair premiums weren't charged so we instead saw flight of funds into the dodgy finance companies.

Now everybody's mad that Treasury didn't do enough to stop it. Labour finance spokesman David Cunliffe was on Radio New Zealand this morning blaming Finance Minister Bill English and Treasury for the disaster. And National rightly takes some of the blame - they agreed with Cullen's rush-job deposit guarantee scheme and they subsequently didn't move quickly enough to force out the dodgy finance companies through higher insurance premiums.

I'm not really sure what Treasury could have done though once the Government had determined they weren't to charge premiums that differed by risk and while under government pressure to let everybody in. I'll have to read the Auditor General's report. It doesn't seem implausible that a Treasury juggling rather a few balls at the time could have fumbled one or two. But the root of the problem was the rush-job legislation with no provision for rationing access by differential premiums. And that goes to Cullen and Key, not to Treasury.

*Alas, Treasury's pdf server seems down so I can't get the exact wording from the report linked-to in the post above-linked. It still shows up on a search of Treasury documents here, but I can't get the file.

The impossible trifecta

Kevin Milligan says a Guaranteed Annual Income cannot simultaneously satisfy three goals. Instead, you have to pick two among the following:
  1. low tax rate
  2. high benefit
  3. balanced budget
Treasury here in New Zealand modelled a GAI for New Zealand on the request of the Welfare Working Group (HT: Lindsay Mitchell). What did they find? A GMI paying $300 per week - the mean benefit income among those on benefits - would cost $44.5 billion, or $52.6 billion if we extended it to superannuitants as a replacement for NZ Super. The former could be covered by a flat personal income tax rate of 45.4%; the latter, 48.6%. But full fiscal neutrality would require tax rates of 50.6% and 54.4% - the lower tax rates would be just enough to cover the transfers, but income tax revenues are currently also used to fund more than just transfers.

If we recognize that most parents are beneficiaries via Working for Families and compensate them for the loss of our version of EITC with a $86 per child per week payment, we get a $57.1 billion fiscal cost and a personal tax rate of 50% (or 55.7% for fiscal neutrality).

And, even this rather expensive system leaves the worst off worse off, as it kinda has to. Treasury notes:
Although the Gini coefficient improves under all models, many beneficiaries (including the disabled, carers and sole parents) currently receive more than $300 per week and would be made financially worse off under a GMI scheme. Therefore the GMIs considered could distribute money away from those most in need of government assistance and toward those who have choices and opportunities but choose not to work.
Treasury also warned about potential adverse labour supply responses to the necessary personal tax rates. And, the induced gap between company and personal tax rates would increase IRD's enforcement costs.

Treasury concludes by reiterating Milligan's impossibility:
From the international examples it is apparent that the more equal a society is in the beginning, the lower the returns to a GMI scheme. That is, a New Zealand specific GMI would either be at a level of income too low to reduce poverty, or a level of income that is high enough to reduce poverty but is therefore expensive and hence distortionary through higher tax rates. 
I don't think Gareth Morgan's Big Kahuna scheme is able to escape the trifecta by imposing new taxes on capital or land. Why? Because those aren't free lunches either. If it's worth having a land tax, it's worth doing it regardless of whether we have a GAI. So in the first stage we set the optimal tax structure - and I'm completely unconvinced that a capital gains tax is all that hot an idea anyway (see Seamus's posts here here and here.) But whatever the optimal tax structure, we implement it in stage one. Then, we still have to increase all the tax rates by enough to pay for a GAI if we're going to have a GAI. And the impossibility reasserts itself.

Morgan squares things with a cheaper GAI paying $11k instead of Treasury's $15k. But I have a hard time believing that's a stable political equilibrium. Could NZ politicos really avoid the temptation of adding targeted benefits for the many folks currently on benefits totalling well over $15k? If not, how quickly do we wind up having a GAI on top of a targeted benefit system?